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FINANCIAL MARKET TURBULENCES – THE SITUATION IN GERMANY 
The article studies the turbulences on the world financial markets, which were caused by the turnaround on the US mortgage 
market leading to a significant increase of default rates, the further turmoil on the markets for asset backed securities and serious 
liquidity troubles in the banking sector. The following paper tries to highlight some reasons for the turbulences on financial markets 
which seem to challenge the banking sector so much. Furthermore the impacts on the German banking sector and on the German 
economy at all are addressed.  
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1. Introduction. At the G7-summit in April 
2006 the President of Deutsche Bundesbank 
estimated the worldwide loss of financial institutes 
which will result from the US subprime crisis with a 
value of 225 billions of U.S. dollars. The following 
paper tries to highlight some reasons for the 
turbulences on financial markets which seem to 
challenge the banking sector so much. Furthermore the 
impacts on the German banking sector and on the 
German economy at all are addressed. Some broad 
conclusions about possible lessons for the future 
follow.
 ©
 
2. The Turnaround on the US Mortgage 
Market. During a period of very low interest rates, 
prices on the housing market in the United States 
raised strongly over the last decade. House prices in 
several regions sometimes doubled within a few 
years. Because of the low interest rates, the burdens 
for house owners where rather limited. Owning a 
house and financing it by mortgages became more 
and more attractive to all parts of the US population. 
The banking sector benefited from this development 
as well. High risky loans seemed to be good 
investments: Although the loan volume was in many 
cases at 100 percent of the real estate that served as 
collateral, the permanently rising house prices 
increased the value of the collateral and reduced the 
risk over time. Furthermore, financial innovations 
made the mortgage business more attractive. 
Different type of structured securities enabled banks 
to outsource risks to the markets. These transferred 
risks were no longer a burden for the balance sheets 
of the banks. However, after the turnaround of US 
house markets, these structured securities became 
the central issue in what is sometimes called the 
biggest financial crisis since fifty years.  
Rising interest rates and a decline in US house 
prices during 2007 (see chart 1) led to a rapid 
growth of defaults on the US mortgage market.  
All kind of mortgage loans, but especially the 
ones with lower quality standards (the subprime 
mortgage market segment) were affected by this 
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development. It resulted in a significant increase of 
default rates (see chart 2). 
 
Source: ECB 2007a, 25 
Chart 1. US House Price Inflation 
Prime 60-Day Delinquencies by Mortgage Vintage Year          
Subprime 60-Day Delinquencies by Mortgage Vintage Year     
 
Source: IMF 2008a, 4 
Chart 2. Loan Delinquencies of Prime and Subprime 
Mortgages (repayment problems, lasting more than 
60 days up to 91 months after the origination) 
Nevertheless, the reason why this development is 
able to disrupt the financial system in the United 
States and worldwide, seem to follow a more 
complex plot where the market for asset backed 
securities comes to the centre of attention (for a 
chronological overview of the events see, e.g. 
Fender/Höhrdahl 2007, 4). 
3. The Turmoil on the Market for Asset 
Backed Securities 
Since the second half of the twentieth century the 
US mortgage market has been strongly characterised 
by the securitization of mortgages. The basic idea is 
to pool similar mortgages and sell securities that 
have claims on the mortgage payments from the 
pool. Normally, all the payments are passed through 
directly to the security holders. For this reason a 
special purposes vehicle (SPV) buys loans and 
mortgages and issues medium to long-term 
securities (ABS = Asset Backed Securities / MBS = 
Mortgage Backed Securities), collateralized by 
mortgages. These securities are purchased by other 
banks, institutional investors, individuals and also 
by the depository institutions themselves. Due to the 
securitization process, the mortgage originators are 
able to remove credit, market and liquidity risks 
from their balance sheets by shifting them to the 
investors. Nevertheless, the sponsors are able to 
earn a fee income from their originating activities, 
because the majority of the issued securities has – 
due to portfolio effects, subordination and other 
credit enhancement techniques – a much better 
rating than the average loan in the pool. Further 
profits were offered by the idea to use the spread 
between long- and short-term interest rates by 
issuing short term securities based on long-term 
properties (ABCP Asset Backed Commercial 
Papers). 
Due to an attractive yield, high liquidity and 
mainly good ratings the demand for such structured 
securities increased permanently. In that way, the 
US mortgage market gained access to a large capital 
source for financing additional loans. The increase 
in the overall mortgage volume triggered very often 
a laxer handling of credit standards. The whole 
process resulted in a substantial increase in high-risk 
subprime mortgages. Nevertheless, many of the 
subprime mortgage loans seemed to be much too 
risky to sell them directly to the broad public. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: ABS = asset-backed security; ABCP = asset-backed commercial paper; CDO = collateralized debt obligation; CDS = credit default swap; SIV = structured investment 
vehicle; SPV = special purpose vehicle. 
Source: IMF 2007, 11 
Chart 3. Mortgage Market Flows 
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Besides other credit enhancement techniques 
(e.g. credit default swaps, liquidity facilities) the 
main idea to move sub-prime mortgage debt through 
the market was to divide up the risk, creating a huge 
volume of low-risk securities and a much smaller 
proportion of high risk segments from the pool of 
mortgages (Dodd 2007, 17). The exact 
subordination differs and might be complex, but the 
main idea looks as follows: A part of an asset 
portfolio is pooled and used as a collateral for 
issuing securities (ABS, MBS and CDOs – 
Collateralized debt obligations), where the 
securitized claims on the pool’s payments are carved 
into different tranches. The securities have a claim 
on principal and interest, where the least risky, 
senior tranches have the first claim on the payments 
from the underlying mortgages. These tranches 
usually have a high credit ranking (sometimes as 
high as AAA) and receive a relatively low interest 
rate payment. After these tranches are paid (at least 
to a special degree), the middle (mezzanine) 
tranches receive its payments which include an 
additional risk premium. 
This tranches represent a higher risk level and 
usually receive a credit ranking that is below-
investment-grade. Only after these tranches are 
repaid fully or at least to a special degree, the equity 
tranche receives payments. Therefore, the equity 
tranche represents the highest risk and is usually 
unrated. This high risk is connected with the highest 
rate of return (Dodd 2007, 15-17). One of the 
outcomes of subordination is the risk of total default 
of some of the involved securities (equity and 
mezzanine tranche). Whereas a total default of an 
underlying loan portfolio seems to be very unlikely, 
a partial default of these loans might lead to a total 
default of lower rated debt tranches. This is an 
important reason for the collapse of the market 
prices of lower rated securities and the enormous 
need for depreciation of some banks during the 
turmoil. The next chart gives a broad illustration of 
the complex securitization structure where the main 
instruments which were causing the turbulences of 
the financial markets are shown. 
Another group of instruments that seems to be of 
high importance for the following turbulences are 
the CDOs. As it can be seen in the next chart, CDOs 
are responsible for a large amount of bank losses 
during the subprime crisis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: IMF 2008c, 13 
Chart 4. Expected Bank Losses as of March 2008 (in billions of U.S. dollars)
The issuing process of a CDO usually starts with a high risky, undiversified portfolio (e.g. locally 
concentrated subprime mortgages) owned by the originator (again we have to mention, that we only describe 
the main idea behind the construction of CDOs, in reality the mechanisms are manifold). The originator 
separates the portfolio and the risk of one portion of the portfolio (the so-called unfunded portion) is directly 
transferred via a credit default swap (CDS) to a super-senior counterparty. This super-senior counterparty 
(usually a highly rated bank or insurance company) acts as a protection seller. For typically at least 80% of 
the underlying portfolio it commits to pay a compensation for defaults to the originator which in return pays 
a premium to the counterparty. This risk for the super-senior counterparty was usually seen as very small 
because (in the 80% example) at least 20% of the credit portfolio has to default before the originator could 
draw on its insurance. That’s why the premium for such insurances is very low. The rest of the portfolio (the 
funded part) is much riskier and therefore the originator uses other mechanisms to protect himself against the 
risk. He transfers the claims on principal and interests to a SPV and in return he receives claims on interest 
and payments from a much lower risky and more diversified portfolio. How does it work? The SPV uses the 
claims on interest and payments of the risky portfolio to issue different tranches of CDOs, which receive 
these rights. The tranches are sold to investors, which use them in a diversified portfolio and therefore don’t 
face the original concentration risk. For these investors the CDOs serve a similar function like other ABS: 
They have a claim on interest and payments of an underlying credit portfolio. The SPV now uses the money 
from the placement of the CDOs to buy other assets (usually other ABS or CDOs) and as a result they build a 
more diversified, less risky collateral portfolio. The interest and principal payments are then passed to the 
originator who receives a much more protected cash flow than it was the case in his original undiversified 
portfolio. 
On the other hand it becomes clear why especially the CDO market was hit by the crunch in the mortgage 
market. What happened? Due to the downgrades of the CDOs the market for these assets dried up and the 
originators weren’t able to secure their loan portfolios as they did before. The payments from the SPV to the 
originator were sharply reduced, because the portfolios of the CDOs mainly consisted of other CDOs and 
ABS. Furthermore the payments to the super-senior counterparties became much more expensive which 
made it even more difficult to protect a loan portfolio. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: ECB 2008, 84, comments by the authors. 
Chart 5. Exemplary Structure of a CDO and Market Failures 
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Unlike publicly traded securities a number of 
these securities and credit derivates are traded on 
over-the-counter (OTC) markets. Usually the 
originators are selling the securities in a 
intransparent way to institutional investors and 
hedge funds, which are capable to take these high 
risk investments. For this reason there is no market 
to determine prices for these assets and the lack of 
public markets means, that there is no institutional 
setting to ensure liquidity for the assets. 
It was into this increasingly complex and 
intransparent framework that the crunch in August 
2007 hit the market for subprime asset backed 
securities. A broad re-evaluation of mortgage-
related products by rating agencies triggered a wave 
of downgrades in mid-2007. The majority of 
mortgage-related ABS as well as CDOs were 
downgraded three to four notches (rating grades), 
some even more. These downgrades where followed 
by a sharp decline in the value of these assets. 
Highly leveraged investors who used these 
assets, especially hedge funds, needed to adjust 
positions or trade out of losing positions and the 
market became suddenly illiquid (Dodd 2007, 19). 
Surprised by sharp decrease of the value of all kinds 
of mortgage-related products which followed, also 
institutional investors and issuers of CDOs stopped 
buying these assets. As a result the demand for the 
assets which were used in CDOs, especially ABS 
and ABCP, decreased further making these market 
segments illiquid too.  
4. Liquidity Troubles in the Banking Sector 
The crisis of the banking sector can be divided 
into three different stages: In the first few months of 
the crisis (after August 2007), the aspect of liquidity 
in the banking sector was in the centre of attention. 
Since November 2007 the discussion about 
decreasing profits and increasing losses in the 
banking sector and their impacts on the real sector 
of the economy, come to the fore (Weber 2008a, 
10). The third wave reached the financial markets in 
February/March 2008, when a massive deleveraging 
in the global financial system take place (Weber 
2008b, 3). Especially the last wave raised concerns 
about the impact of the financial market turbulences 
on the real sector of the economy. 
Let us first turn to the liquidity aspect: The 
banking sector nowadays is characterized by rising 
interdependences of banks and capital markets. 
Banks rely much more on liquidity supply from 
financial markets and from interbank markets than 
in former times when customer deposits played a 
more important role. For this reason banks 
nowadays are more vulnerable to disruptions on 
financial markets (for details see Praet/Herzberg 
2008).  
Due to the growing risk of mortgage-related 
products, it was increasingly difficult to find 
investors for those ABS and CDOs. Therefore the 
sponsors drew the liquidity lines for their asset-
backed-commercial-paper-programs and forced banks 
to buy those products. For some banks these liquidity 
outflows were too high, and as a result, they faced 
serious solvency problems and increasing liquidity 
needs. 
At the same time the possibilities for short-term 
refinancing over the interbank market decreased 
sharply. The result was a dramatic liquidity problem 
for a number of banks worldwide. Main causes of 
the troubles on interbank markets were a lack of 
transparency and confidence (Schönwitz 2007). The 
intransparency of the OTC market aggravated the 
problem, because investors did not know who was – 
and was not – exposed to the subprime risk (Dodd 
2007, 19). Suddenly the risk of default was a serious 
problem even with former highly rated banks being 
the counterparty. The financial market participants 
reacted with a high level of risk aversion, which hit 
especially the interbank market for unsecured short-
term loans. The reaction of banks was to either 
reduce or cancel credit lines for other banks as soon 
as possible. In the light of uncertainty connected 
with the solvency of other banks it seemed 
appropriate to hold liquidity in cash rather than 
taking high risks on interbank markets for a limited 
level of credit margin. Large parts of the credit market 
and especially the interbank lending market dried up 
and risk premia increased sharply (Remsperger, 2007, 
for detailed date see e.g. Deutsche Bundesbank 2008a, 
23).  
In this situation central banks reacted by 
supplying the money market with a high level of 
liquidity (for an overview of central bank actions 
worldwide see e.g. Borio/Nelson 2008, the reaction 
of the European Central Bank is described in ECB 
2007b and Papademos 2008). This led to an easing 
of tension on the money markets. The volatility and 
the spreads between uncollateralized and 
collateralised loans started to tend to a more normal 
level at the beginning of 2008. 
When addressing the problems in the German 
banking sector resulting from the subprime crisis, a 
possible starting point is the total exposure of single 
bank to subprime risks. From the side of financial 
instruments the highest impact on German banks 
resulted from ABCP programs. The next chart 
shows the volume of outstanding ABCP of different 
German banks. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Moody’s (2007), 4 / Latest available data from cooperate websites. 
Chart 6. ABCP Outstanding by Sponsor (in billion U.S. dollars)
It is remarkable, that a number of medium sized 
banks have an equal or even higher engagement in 
the ABCP programs than the biggest German banks. 
And this is the root of the problem in Germany: The 
big German banks had an more or less acceptable 
engagement in this market which raised some 
challenges to overcome the crisis but mainly 
resulted in a decrease of profits only. In contrast to 
the main players some medium sized banks like IKB 
and other banks from the group of state owned 
Landesbanken were strongly over engaged. These 
banks were in a number of cases not capable to 
solve the resulting problems on their own.  
An outstanding example for a crisis caused by 
liquidity problems in Germany is the case of the 
middle sized bank IKB (Industriekreditbank). In mid 
2007 it shocked the market with the announcement 
of large financial losses due to problems on the US 
subprime market. Their main shareholder, the state 
owned Bank for Reconstruction (Kreditanstalt für 
Wiederaufbau - KfW), had to guarantee for a 
number of liquidity facilities for the ABCP vehicle 
Rhineland Funding which was owned by the IKB. 
More than 3.5 billion EUR from the government 
and from other banks were needed to save the IKB 
from bankruptcy. More help in form of almost 6.5 
billion EUR from the government and the Bank for 
Reconstruction followed in spring 2008.  
What had happened to IKB? The ABCP vehicle 
Rhineland Funding bought large amounts of long 
term loans including subprime mortgages. These 
assets where refinanced by issuing short-term asset 
backed commercial papers. To ensure that the 
Rhineland Fund with a capital of only 500 US-$ was 
able to pay back the outstanding debts, the IKB 
guaranteed liquidity lines of 8.1 billion EUR. 
Because of the problems on the US subprime 
market, the Rhineland Funding wasn’t able to sell 
their ABCPs any more, and had to draw down the 
liquidity line of IKB. This in turn overstrained IKB 
with a capital of only 1.4 billion EUR and led 
together with liquidity squeezes on the money 
market to the described rescue operation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 7. Problems of the IKB
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A number of state-owned banks in Germany, namely 
the Sachsen LB and West LB, faced more or less similar 
problems. These events led to rising concerns about the 
stability of the banking sector in Germany.  
5. Financial Losses in the Banking Sector 
Further troubles for banks came up with the 
marking-to-market of mortgage related product 
portfolios, which resulted in severe write-off-losses 
on their balance sheets. Under the countries with the 
highest losses, Germany is seen on rank three after the 
United States and Switzerland. Up to April 2008 
German banks have depreciated around 30 billons of 
U.S. dollars. The following table gives an overview of 
estimated bank losses due to the subprime crisis. 
Table 1 
Global Bank Losses as of March 2008 – Estimations of the IMF (in billions of U.S. dollars) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: IMF 2008c, 52 
Again intransparency is one of the key issues: 
This time not as the starting point of the troubles, 
but as an important reason for the long-lasting 
diagnostic process. Even today there is no clear 
picture of the individual losses of a number of 
banks. As it can be observed in the following chart, 
the value of mortgage related securities decreased 
sharply since mid 2007. It is quiet obvious that due 
to the subprime crisis, there was a considerable need 
for depreciation in the banking sector especially for 
those credit institutes running big portfolios of low 
rated securities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IMF 2008b, 25 
Chart 8. Value of mortgage related securities according to the ABX indices
Because of the intransparency of OTC markets it’s 
not a trivial task for a single bank to calculate the 
absolute need for depreciation accurately. Therefore a 
large number of banks have yet to mark their assets to 
genuine transaction prices (IMF 2008b, 25). 
6. Deleveraging in the Financial System 
During the last few months a strong tendency to 
reduce the ratio of debt financing can be observed in 
the financial system worldwide. The basic concerns 
are that this development might lead to a squeeze in 
borrowing possibilities for companies and private 
households. From this side the financial market 
crisis might have an impact on the real sector in 
form of rising refinancing costs for companies. This 
could lead to a lower level of investments (Weber 
2008a, 10). Recent data (chart 9) show that banks 
indeed raise their lending standards, but currently 
without strong impacts on the lending volume. 
 
Net easing of bank lending standards on loans to non  
financial corporations 
 
 
Net easing of bank lending standards on loans to  
households 
 
 
Source: ECB 2007a, 107/110 
Chart 9. Loan Volumes and Lending Standards 
 
But what seems to be harmful for economic 
growth might be the beginning of a necessary 
readjustment process, because lending standards 
eroded over several years (at least from 2004 to 
2007). As we have seen the high risk taking 
behaviour of many banks was not sustainable. 
7. Some Conclusions 
The crisis in the German banking sector is 
mainly a crisis of a small number of banks, 
which had a – in relation to their capital – too 
high engagement in the U.S. mortgage market. 
These medium sized banks are mostly state 
owned institutes, especially from the group of 
Landesbanken. The impact on these banks was 
accelerated by their lack of profitability which 
raised concerns about their business models for a 
longer time. The banking system in Germany as 
a whole has proven to be highly stable in its core 
(Weber 2008c, 9). Even it is clear that the crisis 
is far from over, there are some signs that at 
least the worst is over (Weber 2008b, 3).  
Concerns about strong impacts on the overall 
economy in Germany seem to be not justified 
from a domestic perspective (Weber 2008c). A 
possible reduction of US growth will have an 
impact on the European and German economy, 
although the results are supposed to be limited 
(Weber 2008a, 11). Furthermore there are a 
number of signs that the Euro area might be 
capable to disentangle itself from a possible 
economic downturn in the United States (Weber 
2008b). 
The recent experience with the subprime 
crisis and its impact on the banking system as 
well as financial markets suggests a number of 
broad conclusions: 
1. The information value of credit rankings 
made by rating agencies is limited. They 
cannot constitute a full substitute for a 
careful own risk analysis (Weber 2008a, 
14). Changes in the role and uses of credit 
ratings are necessary for the future (FSF 
2008, 4) 
2. For a final discussion about the system of 
banking supervision it is still too early. We 
should wait for the full and worldwide 
introduction of the Basel II accord, which 
will lead to a number of improvements 
(Weber 2008a, 14). Especially the capital 
adequacy framework in relation to the 
treatment of securitisation and off-balance 
sheet exposures will be improved. 
Nevertheless there are already some changes 
defined, that should improve the Basel II 
accord (FSF 2008). 
3. Many market participants underestimated 
the interdependencies between different 
market segments (e.g. money, mortgage, 
bond markets), as well as the interplay 
between the real economy (house price 
crisis) and the financial markets. 
Furthermore the importance of liquidity for 
financial markets and the banking system 
was highly underestimated by the market 
participants (Deutsche Bundesbank 2008b, 
86). 
4. The president of the ECB and also the 
Financial Stability Forum suggest a 
significant change of culture. More 
transparency is needed to avoid contagion 
and herd-behaviour in finacial markets and 
the banking sector (Trichet 2008, FSF 
2008). 
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Анотація 
Дана стаття досліджує дестабілізацію на світових фінансових ринках, яка була викликана 
кризовими явищами на іпотечному ринку США і привела до різкого зростання дефолтяв, хаосу на 
ринку цінних паперів, забезпечених активами, а також проблем з ліквідністю у банківському 
секторі.  
У статті розглядаються причини турбулентності на фінансових ринках, їх вплив на банківський 
сектор Німеччини, а також всю економіку цієї країни.  
Отримано 03.11.2008 
 
